Philosophy Misfires

Chief Blogging Officer: "But the interpretation of that event, indeed of any set of historical circumstances, warrants the use of quotation marks around 'the facts.' Everything depends on the lens you look through. For instance, we're fairly sure there was something we call The Inquisition, and something we call The Reformation, and something we call The American Revolution, but what these phrases mean... oh man, don't get me started. Because each seems to mean a lot of different and often conflicting things to a lot of different and often conflicting people. OK, so are we clear on that much, then? "

Well, no. Even that, although I think we're saying the same thing, I can't accede to. We're fairly sure there was something we call The Inquisition, but actually there wasn't, there was no thing outside of a series of factual occurrences and that composite series--or not even that; its results--we call The Inquisition, but a series, not to mention its results, does not a "thing" make. In other words, we construct this and call it a thing. So of course each seems to mean a lot of different and often conflicting things (that word again.)

Chris Locke is using this innocuous example to speak on (many things including) contemporary philosophy, god help him. I can't imagine why-- I mean who needs it besides its own practitioners?-- but he's stumbled into its realms in the person of John Searle. Which leads me to suggest, since lately he's looking at late 19th century thought, Realism/Idealism, Frege, Russell and on up to Wittgenstein, Paris is the capital of France being Russellian, to which Searle would be directly referring and expecting his audience (again philosophy for philosophers) to recognize and therefore actually the perfect example of social construction since Russell was unfamiliar with the lady in question (perhaps a singular instance in both directions)--the blonde one, that is. Only she's not, apparently, blonde today, which is part of it too.

Searle is speaking in a tradition--analytic philosophy, which treats of how we can speak of things and mean anything at all--nothing more than a social construction itself although the Anglophone philosophical community would excommunicate me if it hadn't already for saying so; he's doing the same thing in the title of his book. Paris also being the scioness of Hilton, for instance, Frege treats in reverse in his morning star/evening star (Venus) argument. There might be something there for Mr Locke (Chris, not John) if he cares to, er, Highbeam it. Since I believe he's making the right argument, but framing it with philosophical counterexamples that may not actually be counter, that is. Disclaimer: I am no fan of Searle or of his philosophy of mind, I think it's all historically determined (where "determined" is used very loosely.) I would, and do, lean more toward Gadamer, myself, were I to lean into philosophical buttresses, which I do as much as the next. (The Realism/Idealism nexus being the topic of one of my own abandoned theses.) Which is not to say that Gadamer is not himself guilty of historical blindness, but then that's the point, who isn't? Not me.